（英文版原文发表于《南华早报》）

As the No 2 US diplomat Wendy Sherman kicks off her Asian trip this week, no one has completely ruled out the possibility that she will visit China.

Even before her trip, signals were sent out on several occasions hinting at a high-level engagement between the United States and China. However, whether it is White House Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell’s expectations of a meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, or US national security adviser Jake Sullivan’s suggestion of a Biden-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit, China has yet to say yes.

“Of course we hope to resume dialogue, but it depends on whether the US is sincere,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at the World Peace Forum in Beijing, when asked whether there would be a high-level meeting between China and the US this year.

Wang stressed that the most important thing for China now is to continue to handle its own affairs well. Wang’s attitude was also echoed by officials for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Many have cited cultural and psychological reasons as explanations for China’s reservations. As oriental culture is more sensitive about maintaining reputations and saving face, high-level engagements should be conducted in a friendly environment that may have been specifically created.

So, in the eyes of many Chinese people, when the US announced sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong officials just before the Alaska talks in March, it was a humiliation and far from a friendly curtain-raiser.

This time, ahead of Sherman’s possible visit to China, the US issued a “business advisory” about the risks of operating in Hong Kong and sanctioned seven officials from the central government’s liaison office in Hong Kong – once again sounding an ominous note.

Having said that, behind such cultural and psychological factors are complicated strategic and geopolitical reasons that should be explored.

Why does China remain doubtful about American sincerity? And, what lies behind the US’ expressions of interest in meeting Chinese leaders? To answer these questions, some lessons could be drawn from the meeting in Anchorage, Alaska.

As clearly manifested in the Anchorage talks, the US does not engage with China with the sincere intention to deal with bilateral issues, such as enhancing cooperation or tackling global challenges together in the time of Covid-19. Rather, the US seeks first to appease its domestic audience.

A diplomatic meeting was turned into a showcase for the Biden administration’s tough policy towards China before the American public, including the Republicans. This is a clear signal that the US-China engagement in Anchorage was about teaching the Chinese a lesson on human rights issues, rather than improving bilateral relations.

As the No 2 US diplomat Wendy Sherman kicks off her Asian trip this week, no one has completely ruled out the possibility that she will visit China.

Even before her trip, signals were sent out on several occasions hinting at a high-level engagement between the United States and China. However, whether it is White House Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell’s expectations of a meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, or US national security adviser Jake Sullivan’s suggestion of a Biden-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit, China has yet to say yes.

“Of course we hope to resume dialogue, but it depends on whether the US is sincere,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at the World Peace Forum in Beijing, when asked whether there would be a high-level meeting between China and the US this year.

Wang stressed that the most important thing for China now is to continue to handle its own affairs well. Wang’s attitude was also echoed by officials for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Many have cited cultural and psychological reasons as explanations for China’s reservations. As oriental culture is more sensitive about maintaining reputations and saving face, high-level engagements should be conducted in a friendly environment that may have been specifically created.

So, in the eyes of many Chinese people, when the US announced sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong officials just before the Alaska talks in March, it was a humiliation and far from a friendly curtain-raiser.

This time, ahead of Sherman’s possible visit to China, the US issued a “business advisory” about the risks of operating in Hong Kong and sanctioned seven officials from the central government’s liaison office in Hong Kong – once again sounding an ominous note.

Having said that, behind such cultural and psychological factors are complicated strategic and geopolitical reasons that should be explored.

Why does China remain doubtful about American sincerity? And, what lies behind the US’ expressions of interest in meeting Chinese leaders? To answer these questions, some lessons could be drawn from the meeting in Anchorage, Alaska.

As clearly manifested in the Anchorage talks, the US does not engage with China with the sincere intention to deal with bilateral issues, such as enhancing cooperation or tackling global challenges together in the time of Covid-19. Rather, the US seeks first to appease its domestic audience.

A diplomatic meeting was turned into a showcase for the Biden administration’s tough policy towards China before the American public, including the Republicans. This is a clear signal that the US-China engagement in Anchorage was about teaching the Chinese a lesson on human rights issues, rather than improving bilateral relations.

Notably, the timing of Sherman’s possible visit and its strategic intentions give the lie to the seriousness of the Biden administration’s intentions to engage China.

It is customary for a new US administration’s first state visits to be to allied countries. Biden has just finished his alliance campaign in Europe, where he attended the G7 summit last month.

He has held face-to-face meetings with leaders of allied countries including Britain, Japan and South Korea. Since the US views China as a rival, it’s natural that it is not on that list.

However, the strained relationship between the US and Russia has not prevented Biden from meeting President Vladimir Putin in a third country.

Even at the height of the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union remained engaged with each other to at least manage the crisis. Thus, Sherman’s by-the-way visit to China speaks for itself. This is an itinerary detail that’s more optional than essential.

Finally, it is the strategic intention behind the US engagement with China that plays the most important role in defining the relationship between the two. Domestically, the Biden administration has seldom delivered policy positions without the containment of China serving as a backdrop.

Internationally, the China issue has been put forward by the US as a central topic to be discussed with all its allies and partners on either bilateral or multilateral occasions.

The US has urged these nations to take a harder line on Beijing’s human rights problem, economic practices, hi-tech development and military issues. A new global infrastructure programme, “Build Back Better World”, has been purposely adopted to rival China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

All these efforts are aimed at better positioning the US in its competition with China. US practices give the distinct impression that the nation is not developing itself to deliver peace and prosperity to its people and the international community. Instead, it is mobilising its domestic and international resources to contain another state. Its strategic goal is not to develop itself but to compete with another nation.

Worse, at a time when fighting the Covid-19 pandemic and restoring the economy are top human rights priorities for the world, and international cooperation is more necessary than ever, the US has used every lever it has to push big-power competition.

The dilemma of having to choose a side has been thrust upon nearly every state, like it or not. Disinformation, sanctions and coercion with regard to China have become the “new normal” as the US pushes others to take sides.

When diplomatic engagement is applied in a strategic confrontation, it is no wonder that China is being cautious. Chinese wariness should also serve as a warning to other countries in this region.

When the Biden administration loudly declares that the US is back, it also means that America is back in the Asia-Pacific. However, given the devastation of the Korean, Afghanistan and Vietnam wars, the real question is how much the US can be trusted to deliver on its boast that it plays a stabilising role in the region.

Dr Cheng Jing is an associate fellow at the Global Governance Institution and lecturer at the School of Foreign Studies, Xidian University

Xu Jingzhi is an intern at the Global Governance Institution. She studies at New York University Shanghai, majoring in political science and economics

（https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3141792/will-xi-meet-biden-why-china-wary-us-diplomatic-intentions）